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Abstract
State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with m items achieve ap-
proximation guarantees of O((log logm)3) [1]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to
compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoid-
able, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an m1/2−ε-approximation for
any ε > 0 [23]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient
and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms.
We show that this distinction disappears with a mild relaxation of truthfulness, which we
term implementation in advised strategies, and that has been previously studied in relation to
“Implementation in Undominated Strategies” [4]. Specifically, advice maps a tentative strategy
either to that same strategy itself, or one that dominates it. We say that a player follows advice
as long as they never play actions which are dominated by advice. A poly-time mechanism guar-
antees an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies if there exists advice (which
runs in poly-time) for each player such that an α-approximation is achieved whenever all players
follow advice. Using an appropriate bicriterion notion of approximate demand queries (which
can be computed in poly-time), we establish that (a slight modification of) the [1] mechanism
achieves the same O((log logm)3)-approximation in implementation in advised strategies.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial auctions have been at the forefront of Algorithmic Game Theory since its incep-
tion as a lens through which to study the relative power of algorithms for honest agents versus
mechanisms for strategic agents. Specifically, there are n buyers with combinatorial valuations
v1(·), . . . , vn(·) over subsets of m items, and the designer wishes to allocate the items so as to
maximize the welfare,
∑
i vi(Si) (where Si is the set allocated to bidder i). Without concern for
computation/communication/etc., the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [43, 11, 30]
provides a black-box reduction from precisely optimal mechanisms to precisely optimal algorithms.
Of course, precisely optimal algorithms are NP-hard and require exponential communication in
most settings of interest (for example, when buyers have submodular valuations over the items,
which we’ll take as the running example for the rest of the introduction), rendering VCG inap-
plicable. On the algorithmic front, poly-time/poly-communication constant-factor approximation
algorithms are known [40, 32, 35, 6, 44, 26] and a central direction in algorithmic mechanism de-
sign is understanding whether these guarantees are achievable by computationally/communication
efficient truthful mechanisms as well.
∗Supported by NSF CCF-1717899.
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From the communication complexity perspective, this problem is still wide open: state-of-the-art
truthful mechanisms guarantee an O((log logm)3)-approximation [1], yet no lower bounds separate
achievable guarantees of mechanisms from algorithms (that is, it could very well be the case that
truthful, poly-communication mechanisms can achieve the same guarantees as poly-communication
algorithms). From the computational perspective, however, a landmark result of Dobzinski and
Vondrak establishes that for all ε > 0, an m1/2−ε-approximation is NP-hard for truthful mecha-
nisms [23]. As poly-time algorithms guarantee an e/(e − 1)-approximation [44], this establishes a
strong separation between computationally-efficient algorithms and computationally-efficient truth-
ful mechanisms.
So while the communication perspective has seen exciting progress in recent years [17, 5], the
computational perspective is generally considered fully resolved. In this paper, we present a new
dimension to the computational perspective, motivated by the following two examples. Consider
first the truthful mechanism of [1]. The core of the mechanism is a posted-price mechanism: it
visits each bidder one at a time, posts a price pj on each remaining item j, and offers the option
to purchase any set S of items at total price
∑
j∈S pj (see Section 4 and Appendix B for a full
description of their mechanism, which also includes randomization, pre-procesesing, and learning).
The auxiliary parts of the mechanism run in poly-time,1 and the offered prices can also be computed
in poly-time. While it might sound like this mechanism should be poly-time, the catch is that it’s
NP-hard for the buyer find their utility-maximizing set, called a demand query. Therefore, the
mechanism is either not truthful (because the buyers do not select their utility-maximizing sets),
or requires solving an NP-hard problem (because the buyers pick their favorite sets). Still, the
analysis of [1] and related mechanisms [14, 20, 33, 13, 28, 16, 24, 16] seems fairly robust, suggesting
that perhaps they should maintain their guarantees under reasonable strategic behavior. Indeed,
the focus of this paper establishing precisely this claim, for a formal notion of “reasonable strategic
behavior.”
Solution Concept: Implementation in Advised Strategies. To get intuition, consider
the following example due to [41]: there is only a single buyer, but the buyer can receive only k
of the m items (this is the one-buyer case of Combinatorial Public Projects). Since there is just
a single buyer, the obvious mechanism for the designer simply allows the buyer to pick any set of
size k for free (call this the “Set-For-Free” mechanism). The same catch is that it is NP-hard for
the buyer to pick their favorite set, so Set-For-Free is again either not truthful (because the buyer
picks a suboptimal set) or solving an NP-hard problem (because they find their favorite set). In
fact, [41] establishes that it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to achieve a m1/2−ε-approximation
for any ε > 0. Algorithmically, a poly-time e/(e− 1)-approximation is known [37], providing again
a strong separation.
We ask instead: what should one reasonably expect to happen if a strategic buyer participated
in Set-For-Free? Consider the set S output by the poly-time algorithm of [37]. It is certainly
reasonable for the buyer to select some set T 6= S: perhaps a different heuristic finds a better set.
But it seems irrational for the buyer to select some set T with v(T ) < v(S). We therefore pose
that there should be some reasonable solution concept under which Set-For-Free guarantees an
e/(e − 1)-approximation. Indeed, Set-For-Free guarantees an e/(e − 1)-approximation under our
proposed “implementation in advised strategies.”
Formally, we will think of Set-For-Free as simply asking the buyer to report a set of size at most
k, and then awarding them that set for free. In addition, the designer provides advice: a Turing
machine A(·, ·) which takes as input the buyer’s valuation v(·) (possibly as a circuit/Turing machine
itself, or accessing it via value queries) and a tentative set T , then recommends a set S to purchase
1Rather, they can be slightly modified to run in poly-time — see Section 4 and Appendix B.
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that is at least as good as T . Specifically in Set-For-Free, we will think of the advice as running
the [37] approximation algorithm to get a set S′ and outputting S := argmax{v(T ), v(S′)}. We
say that a bidder follows advice if they select a set S with A(v, S) = S. The idea is that it seems
irrational for the buyer to select a set without this property, when the advice gives a poly-time
algorithm to improve it.
For a general mechanism, we think of advice as a Turing machine which takes as input the
current state of the mechanism, the buyer’s valuation, and a tentative action, then advises an
(maybe the same, maybe different) action to take. Importantly, we say that advice is useful if
for all strategies s, either the advice maps s to itself, or to another strategy which dominates it
(see Section 2 for full definition). Intuitively, this suggests that it is irrational for a buyer to use a
strategy which advice does not map to itself. We postpone to Section 2 a formal definition of what
it means to follow advice, but note here a few quick properties: (a) if s is a dominant strategy,
then any useful advice maps s to itself, so playing s follows advice, (b) in fact, even if s is only
undominated, then any useful advice maps s to itself, so playing s follows advice2, but also (c) it
is possible for dominated strategies to follow advice as well (depending on the advice).
We say that mechanism guarantees a poly-time α-approximation in implementation in advised
strategies whenever the mechanism itself concludes in poly-time, and there exists poly-time advice
A such that an α-approximation is guaranteed whenever all bidders follow advice A. Again, note
that the assumption on bidder behavior is quite permissive: they need not play a dominant, or
even undominated strategy. We just assume they do not play a strategy which the advice itself
dominates (so the challenge is establishing that the concept is still restrictive enough to guarantee
an α-approximation).
Advice via Approximate Demand Queries. We now revisit posted-price mechanisms,
which achieve approximation guarantees of O((log logm)3), but whose truthfulness requires buyers
to compute NP-hard demand queries. Instead, we pursue guarantees in implementation in advised
strategies. For a posted-price mechanism with price vector p, our proposed advice will take as
input a tentative set T for purchase, and the buyer’s valuation v(·), and recommend a set S
guaranteeing v(S) − p(S) ≥ v(T ) − p(T ).3 More specifically, our advice will compute a tentative
recommendation S′ independently of T , then simply recommend argmax{v(S′)−p(S), v(T )−p(T )}.
Again, our behavioral assumption does not assume that the buyer will purchase the set S′ tentatively
recommended, just that they will not irrationally ignore the advice in favor of a lower-utility set.
The remaining challenge is now to find concrete advice under which the [1] approximation
guarantees are maintained. A first natural attempt is simply an approximate demand oracle: have
a tentative recommendation S′ with v(S′) − p(S′) ≥ c · maxT {v(T ) −
∑
j∈T pj}. Unfortunately,
even this is NP-hard for any c = Ω(1/m1−ε) (for any ε > 0) [27]. Instead, we design bicriterion
approximate demand oracles. Specifically, for some c, d < 1, a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle
produces a set S′ satisfying v(S′) − p(S′) ≥ c · maxT {v(T ) − p(T )/d}. That is, the guaranteed
utility is at least an c-fraction of the optimum if all prices were increased by a factor of 1/d. We
design a simple greedy (1/2, 1/2)-approximation in poly-time (based on [35]), and further establish
that the [1] mechanism maintains its approximation guarantee up to an additional min{c, d} factor
when bidders follow advice provided in this manner by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle. This
allows us to conclude the main result of this paper:
2 Thus, implementation in advised strategies is more permissive than “Feasible Implementation in Undominated
Strategies” originally used in [3]. Moreover, implementation in advised strategies is essentially equivalent to the more
general “Algorithmic Implementation” used in [4], as we discuss in Section 2.
3Throughout the paper we will use notation p(S) :=
∑
i∈S pi.
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Theorem 1.1. There exists a poly-time mechanism which achieves an O((log logm)3)-approximation
to the optimal welfare for any number of submodular buyers in implementation in advised strategies.
1.1 Roadmap
Combinatorial auctions have a long history within AGT, along with related problems like Combina-
torial Public Projects. The most related work is overviewed in Section 1, but we provide additional
context in Section 1.2. Section 2 contains a formal definition of implementation in advised strate-
gies, repeating our motivating examples and providing additional discussion.
In Section 3, we design our poly-time (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracles for submodular
valuations. The proof is fairly simple, but we include the complete proof in the body for readers
unfamiliar with [35] (readers familiar with [35] will find the outline simliar).
In Section 4, we establish that existing posted-price mechanisms maintain their approximation
guarantees as long as buyers follow advice given by (Ω(1),Ω(1))-approximate demand oracles. We
include a complete analysis of the main lemma of [28] concerning “fixed price auctions” for readers
unfamiliar with this aspect (readers familiar with [28] will find the outline similar). We defer all
aspects of the analysis of [1] to Appendix B.
Finally, in Section 5, we design simple poly-time ( 1√
m
, 1
1+
√
m
)-approximate demand oracles for
subadditive valuations. This is essentially the best possible even for XOS valuations,4 due to known
lower bounds on welfare-maximization with value queries [19] and the results of Section 4.
1.2 Discussion and Related Work
There is a vast literature studying combinatorial auctions, which we will not attempt to overview
in its entirety here. We summarize the lines of work most relevant to ours below.
VCG-based Mechanisms. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism provides a poly-time/poly-
communication black-box reduction from precise welfare maximization with a truthful mechanism
to precise welfare maximization with an algorithm for any class of valuation functions [43, 11, 30].
The same reduction applies for “maximal-in-range” approximation algorithms, but this approach
provably cannot achieve sub-polynomial approximations in poly-time (unless P = NP) or subex-
ponential communication [10, 9, 12]. Still, in some regimes (e.g. arbitrary monotone valuations
with poly-time/poly-communication, or XOS valuations with poly-time), no better than a Θ(
√
m)-
approximation is achievable even with honest players, and a Θ(
√
m)-approximation is achievable
via truthful VCG-based mechanisms [34, 19].
Combinatorial Auctions in the Computational Model. Taking the above discussion into
account, valuation function classes above XOS (including subadditive, or arbitrary monotone) are
“too hard”, in the sense that Θ(
√
m) is the best approximation achievable in poly-time even without
concern for incentives, and this guarantee can be matched by VCG-based truthful mechanisms.
Other valuation function classes like Gross Substitutes are “easy”, in the sense that precise welfare
maximization is achievable in poly-time, so the VCG mechanism is poly-time as well. Submodular
valuations are a fascinating middle ground. Here, an algorithmic e/(e−1)-approximations is possible
in poly-time (and it is NP-hard to do better) [44, 36, 21], but a long series of works establishes
that it is NP-hard for a truthful mechanism to even achieve an m1/2−ε-approximation (for any
ε > 0) [38, 9, 10, 12, 15, 22, 21, 23].
4More precisely, it is unconditionally hard to obtain a (1/m1/2−ε, 1/m1/2−ε)-approximate demand query for XOS
valuations using polynomially many black-box value queries.
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On this front, our work establishes that significantly better (O((log logm)3)) guarantees are
achievable with a slightly relaxed solution concept, matching the state-of-the-art in the commu-
nication model. In addition to the standalone motivation for the communication model discussed
below, our work establishes that resolving key open questions (e.g. is there a constant-factor approx-
imation in the communication model for submodular valuations?) may have strong implications in
the computational model as well (via implementation in advised strategies).
Combinatorial Auctions in the Communication Model. In the communication model,
only arbitrary monotone valuations are “too hard” per the above discussion: a 2-approximation
is possible for subadditive valuations, and a 11−(1−1/n)n -approximation is possible for XOS valu-
ations in poly-communication, both of which are tight [26, 19, 25]. Yet, no truthful constant-
factor approximations are known (the state-of-the-art is O((log logm)3) for submodular/XOS [1]
or O(logm log logm) for subadditive [14]). On the lower bounds side, no separations are known be-
tween the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms and non-truthful algorithms using poly(n,m)
communication, even for deterministic truthful mechanisms (where the O(
√
m)-approximation
of [19] remains the state-of-the-art). Determining whether such a separation exists is the central
open problem of this agenda (e.g. [17, 5]).
On this front, our work in some sense unifies the state-of-the-art for submodular valuations
in the communication and computational models via implementation in advised strategies. So in
addition to the standalone interest in establishing (or disproving) a separation in the communication
model, such a result will now likely have implications in the computational model as well.
Posted Price Mechanisms. Posted-price mechanisms are ubiquitous in mechanism design,
owing to their simplicity and surprising ability to guarantee good approximations through a variety
of lenses [33, 13, 28, 16, 24, 1]. Very recent work also establishes posted-price mechanisms as the
unique class of mechanisms which is “strongly obviously strategy-proof” [39]. One minor downside
of these mechanisms is that they require buyers to compute NP-hard demand queries. Our work
formally mitigates this downside under implementation in advised strategies. For example, our
work immediately extends the price of anarchy bounds of [13] to hold in equilibria which are poly-
time learnable for submodular buyers (previously the equilibria required computation of demand
queries).
Combinatorial Public Projects. Combinatorial Public Projects is a related problem, which
has also received substantial attention. Here, the designer may select any set of k items, but
every bidder receives all k items (instead of the bidders each receiving disjoint sets of items, as
in auctions). We used the single submodular bidder Combinatorial Public Projects problem as a
motivating example due to the hardness results established in [41]: no poly-time truthful mechanism
can achieve an approximation ratio better than O(
√
m) (unless P = NP). Contrast this with
the general communication model, where Set-For-Free is truthful and precisely optimizes welfare.
Follow up work of [8] establishes that while the single-bidder CPPP is inapproximable only because
demand queries are NP-hard, the strong multi-bidder inapproximability results of [38, 10] hold even
when bidders have access to demand oracles.
[33, 16, 1] already establish that the aforementioned computational separations no longer hold
with demand oracles (so the story for combinatorial auctions differs greatly from combinatorial
public projects). Our work further establishes that the same guarantees are achievable in truly
polynomial time, under a relaxed solution concept.
(c, d)-Approximate Demand Oracles. To the best of our knowledge, bicriterion approximate
demand oracles have not previously been considered. However, prior work regarding approximation
5
algorithms for nonnegative submodular functions with bounded curvature subject to a matroid
constraint designs a randomized (1 − 1/e, 1 − 1/e)-approximate demand oracle for submodular
functions (under a different name) [42, 29, 31]. We include our (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand
oracles for submodular functions as they are deterministic and significantly simpler (note also that
determinism makes our related solution concepts significantly cleaner).
Related Solution Concepts. To best understand Implementation in Advised Strategies in
comparison to previous solution concepts, it is helpful to first revisit them. Implementation in
Dominant Strategies “predicts” that all players will play a dominant strategy, if one exists. But
not all games have dominant strategies (or those dominant strategies may be NP-hard to find).
Implementation in Undominated Strategies (e.g. [3]) is significantly more permissive, and only
“predicts” that all players will play an undominated strategy, which are guaranteed to exist. But
it may be NP-hard to find an undominated strategy (as in the examples given in Section 1 —
the dominant strategy is the only undominated one). Implementation in Advised Strategies (and
the essentially equivalent notion of Algorithmic Implementation [4] – see Section 2) is even more
permissive, it only “predicts” that players will not play a strategy which is dominated by a particular
poly-time computable advice. The main purpose of this solution concept is to have bite even when it
is NP-hard to find an undominated strategy. The main challenge with permissive solution concepts
is that it becomes harder to establish approximation guarantees (as now the guarantees must hold
within a large range of bidder behavior).
It is also worth noting that only two prior works have used the equivalent concept of Algorithmic
Implementation [4, 2]. Both of these works design auctions which have no dominant strategy, and
use the solution concept to find a rich set of strategies which are “reasonable enough” to prove
approximation guarantees. In our application, the posted-price mechanisms do have a dominant
strategy, it is just NP-hard to find it, so we find a rich set of strategies which can be found in
poly-time (and are also “reasonable enough” to prove approximation guarantees).
2 Implementation in Advised Strategies
Motivated by the example of [41], we first relax the requirement that a mechanism be truthful,
instead requiring that a mechanism achieve its approximation guarantee whenever players behave
in a manner which is not clearly irrational. Before proposing our formal definition, let’s examine
it applied to two motivating examples.
Example One: [41]. There is a single buyer with submodular valuation function v(·). The
seller’s mechanism (Set-For-Free) allows the buyer to state any set of size k, and receive that set
for free. Recall that it is NP-hard for the buyer to find their favorite set of size k — so if the
mechanism is to be truthful, it is not poly-time (unless P = NP). The buyer can indeed find an
e/(e−1)-approximation in poly-time [37], but assuming the buyer will run this particular algorithm
(or any specific approximation algorithm) is perhaps too strong an assumption.
Instead, we assume simply that the buyer picks a set yielding at least as much utility as this
e/(e−1)-approximation. Specifically, we will think of the designer as providing a poly-time mecha-
nism (Set-For-Free — the buyer states a set of size k and receives that set for free), and a poly-time
advice algorithm (takes as input the buyer’s valuation function v(·), and a tentative set S, then
runs the e/(e− 1)-approximation to get a set T and outputs argmax{v(S), v(T )}, tie-breaking for
S). Intuitively, we are claiming that it is certainly rational for the buyer to purchase a set other
than T , but that it is irrational to purchase a set with v(S) < v(T ).
Example Two: Posted-Price Mechanisms. Consider now any posted-price mechanism.
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Again, we think of the designer as providing a poly-time mechanism (for all i, computes in poly-
time a price vector to offer bidder i, based on interactions with bidders < i), along with a poly-time
advice algorithm (takes as input the buyer’s valuation function v(·), a tentative set S, computes
in poly-time a set T and outputs argmax{v(S) − p(S), v(T ) − p(T )}, again tie-breaking for S).
Again note that we are claiming that it may be rational for the buyer to purchase a set other than
T , but that it is irrational to purchase a set yielding lower utility than T .
Importantly, we emphasize that we assume the buyer achieves at least as much utility as rec-
ommended (a well-justified behavioral assumption, although not particularly convenient for welfare
guarantees), and not that the buyer picks a set guaranteeing them at least as much welfare (more
convenient for analyzing welfare guarantees, but an unmotivated assumption). With these instan-
tiations in mind, we now build up language to present our formal definition.
Definition 2.1 (Mechanism as an Extended Form Game). Formally, a mechanism is just an
extended form game: at every state, it solicits actions from one or more players and (possibly
randomly) updates its state. With probability one, the mechanism eventually reaches a terminal
state, and (possibly randomly) outputs an allocation of items and payments charged.
A mechanism is poly-time if every state update is poly-time computable, and the mechanism
reaches a terminal state with probability one after poly(n,m) updates.
Definition 2.2 (Strategies, Utility, and Dominance). A strategy s(·) for player i is simply a
mapping from the current state x of the mechanism to an action s(x).
We denote by ui(vi, ~s) the expected utility of player i when their valuation function is vi(·) and
the players use strategy profile ~s.
Strategy s(·) dominates strategy s′(·) for player i with valuation vi(·) if for all s−i, ui(vi, si;~s−i) ≥
ui(vi, s
′
i;~s−i), and there exists an ~s−i such that ui(vi, si;~s−i) > ui(vi, s
′
i;~s−i).
Definition 2.3 (Advice). Advice is a function A(·, ·, ·) which takes as input the valuation vi(·) of
a player, a state x of a mechanism, and a tentative action a, then (possibly randomly) outputs an
advised action A(vi, x, a). We say that advice is poly-time if it is poly-time computable.
Observe that every advice A(·, ·, ·), valuation function vi(·), and tentative strategy s(·) induces
a strategy Avi,s(·) with Avi,s(x) := A(vi, x, s(x)).
Definition 2.4 (Useful Advice). We say that advice A is useful if:
1. For all s(·), and all vi(·), either Avi,s(·) = s(·), or Avi,s(·) dominates s(·) (for vi(·)).
2. For all s(·) and all vi(·), Avi,Avi,s(·) = Avi,s(·) (Advice is idempotent — applying advice to
s(·) twice is the same as applying it once).
Intuitively, Property 1 guarantees that the bidder should indeed follow advice given by A instead
of whatever strategy they had originally planned. Property 2 guarantees essentially that the bidder
does not get “stuck” in an exponentially-long loop trying to repeatedly improve their strategy
via advice (because the loop terminates after one iteration). Let us briefly observe the following
implication of our definition (which we explore further when revisiting our two main examples):
Observation 2.5. Let A(·, ·, ·) be useful, and let A(vi, x, a) 6= a. Then for all s such that s(x) = a,
Avi,s(·) dominates s(·).
Intuitively, useful advice A separates strategies into advised strategies (where Avi,s(·) = s(·)),
and ill-advised strategies (where Avi,s(·) dominates s(·)). We say that a bidder follows advice if
they use an advised strategy.
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Definition 2.6 (Follows Advice). We say that s(·) is advised for vi(·) under A if Avi,s(·) = s(·).
A bidder with valuation vi(·) follows advice A if they use a strategy which is advised under A.
Intuitively, we are claiming that it is irrational for a player to use an ill-advised strategy s(·)
(because they could instead use the strategy Avi,s(·), which dominates it).
Definition 2.7 (Implementation in Advised Strategies). We say that a mechanism M guarantees
an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies with advice A if A is useful and for
all v1(·), . . . , vn(·), if all players follow advice A, the resulting allocation in M achieves (expected)
welfare at least α ·OPT(v1, . . . , vn). If both M and A are poly-time, we say that M guarantees a
poly-time α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies (without referencing A).
Let’s now briefly revisit our two examples through the formal definitions. First, recall the
single-bidder mechanism Set-For-Free. Set-For-Free is poly-time: it takes as input a set and simply
outputs that set, and terminates after one iteration. Consider the advice algorithm which takes
as input v(·), and a set S, then runs the e/(e − 1)-approximation algorithm of [37] to get a set T
and outputs argmax{v(S), v(T )}, tie-breaking for S (the mechanism has only a single non-terminal
state, so this completely specifies the advice). Then the advice indeed recommends a dominating
strategy whenever it recommends T 6= S, and is idempotent (tie-breaking in favor of S is subtly
necessary for this claim — if instead the advice tie-broke for T , then it might recommend an action
distinct from S which does not dominate it). Moreover, observe that the bidder follows advice if
and only if they choose a higher value set than produced by the algorithm, and therefore we’re
guaranteed a e/(e − 1)-approximation whenever the bidder follows advice.
Posted-price mechanisms with poly-time computable prices are poly-time: they iteratively take
as input a set from bidder i, assign that set to bidder i, then run a poly-time computation to
determine the prices for bidder i+1. They terminate after n iterations. We will later design poly-
time approximate demand oracles, which take as input vi(·) and the price vector p, and output
a recommended set D(vi,p) in poly-time. For a posted-price mechanism, there are multiple non-
terminal states, each corresponding to a different price vector p. Our advice, on input vi, S,p,
will advise the set argmax{v(S) − p(S), v(D(vi,p)) − p(D(vi,p))}, again tie-breaking in favor
of S.5 If a strategy follows advice, it must, for all p, select a set S satisfying vi(S) − p(S) ≥
vi(D(vi,p))−p(D(vi,p)). It’s not immediately clear why this property should provide meaningful
welfare guarantees, but we will later argue that the right pairing of mechanism and notion of
approximate demand oracle achieves polynomial-time welfare guarantees which match state-of-the-
art guarantees for computationally-unbounded bidders.
Brief Discussion of Definitions. We chose our definitions with the goal of (a) providing
a strict relaxation of truthfulness, and (b) doing so in a way that permits all rational behavior
while (c) still eliminating enough irrational behavior to guarantee good welfare. We include in
Appendix A a brief example motivating our decision to think of advice as improving a given strategy
as opposed to outright proposing a replacement strategy. We conclude this section by establishing
that implementation in advised strategies is a strict relaxation of truthfulness and implementation
in undominated strategies [3], and is additionally equivalent to Algorithmic Implementation [4].
Observation 2.8. If player i with valuation vi has a dominant strategy s
∗(·) in mechanism M ,
and Avi,s(·) := s∗(·) for all s(·), then the only strategy which follows advice is s∗(·) itself.
5Again, note that tie-breaking in favor of T would violate the definition of usefulness, via Observation 2.5. For
a detailed example, consider the strategy s(·) which purchases a utility-maximizing set on all prices 6= p, and set S
on p. Then any advice which tie-breaks in favor of T on prices p does not map s(·) to itself, and does not dominate
s(·) (because it generates the same utility on prices p, and cannot generate strictly higher utility on any other prices,
because s(·) is optimal).
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Observation 2.9. If strategy s(·) is undominated for player i with valuation vi(·), and advice A is
useful, then Avi,s(s) = s. Therefore, if a mechanism achieves an α-approximation in implementa-
tion in advised strategies, it also achieves an α-approximation in implementation in undominated
strategies.
Proof. This is simply because useful advice must have Avi,s(·) dominate s or be equal to s. Because
s is undominated, the former is impossible. Thus, if agents in this mechanism play undominated
strategies, they play strategies which follow advice.
Let us now recall the definition of Algorithmic Implementation [4]:
Definition 2.10 (Algorithmic Implementation, Definition 5.1 in [4]). A mechanism M is an al-
gorithmic implementation of a c-approximation (in undominated strategies) if there exists a set of
strategies D with the following properties:
1. M obtains a c-approximation for any combination of strategies from D, in polynomial time.
2. For any strategy that does not belong to D, there exists a strategy in D that dominates it.
Furthermore, we require that this “improvement step” can be computed in polynomial time.
Observation 2.11. Let M achieve an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies.
Then M is an Algorithmic Implementation of an α-approximation.
Proof. Simply define D to be the set of advised strategies, and the useful advice A(·, ·, ·) to be the
improvement step. By definition, M obtains a α-approximation for any advised strategies. Also
by definition, A(·, ·, ·) is a poly-time mapping from ill-advised strategies (not in D) to advised ones
(D), as desired.
Note that the converse of Observation 2.11 is not technically true if one takes Definition 2.10
verbatim — the issue is that their “improvement step” need not be useful advice, because it is
only defined as a function of strategies not in D (and could be arbitrarily bizarre on inputs in D).
Based on discussion surrounding their Definition 5.1 (and recent personal communication with an
author), however, it seems clear that this is just a minor oversight and the intended definition would
also require the improvement step to be the identity within D. With this minor modification, the
converse of Observation 2.11 holds, and the two concepts are equivalent (D is exactly the advised
strategies, and the improvement step is exactly A(·, ·, ·)). We choose to introduce our definitions
and notation because they emphasize the advice/improvement step (which is more intuitive for our
application), rather than the advised strategies/D. Also, it is easier to rigorously define what it
means to have a poly-time mapping between complete strategies in an extended form game (which
may have exponentially many possible states) when focusing on advice.
3 Approximate demand oracles
In this section, we develop our poly-time advice for posted-price mechanisms in the form of an
approximate demand oracle. Recall that a demand oracle for valuation function v(·) takes as input
a price vector p and outputs a set in argmaxS⊆M{v(S) − p(S)}. Recall also that implementing a
demand oracle is NP-hard when v(·) is submodular. In fact, it is NP-hard to even guarantee better
than a m-approximation when v(·) is submodular (more precisely, for any ε > 0 it is NP-hard to
guarantee a set T satisfying v(T )− p(T ) ≥ 1
O(m1−ε)
·maxS{v(S)− p(S)} [27]). Motivated by this,
we pursue instead a bicriterion approximation. Specifically:
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Definition 3.1. For any c, d ≤ 1, a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle takes as input a valuation
function v(·) and a price vector p and outputs a set of items S such that
v(S)− p(S) ≥ c ·max
T
{v(T ) − p(T )/d}.
That is, a (c, d)-demand oracle outputs a set guaranteeing at least a c-fraction of the optimal
utility if all prices were blown up by a factor of 1/d. We refer to the utility of the optimal bundle with
these higher prices (i.e. maxT {v(T )−p(T )/d}) as the benchmark (so our goal is to be c-competitive
with the benchmark). In this section, we establish that poly-time (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand
oracles exist for submodular functions, based on the simple greedy algorithm of [35].
Algorithm 1 SimpleGreedy(v,p,M)
S ← ∅
for j = 1, . . . ,m do ⊲ For items in an arbitrary order
if v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≥ 2p(j) then ⊲ If the marginal gain is at least twice the price
S ← S ∪ {j} ⊲ Then allocate that item
return S
Proposition 3.2. When v(·) is submodular, SimpleGreedy is a (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand ora-
cle.
Proof. Our proof follows by induction on the number of items m. Importantly, observe that Sim-
pleGreedy is recursive. Specifically, if we do not allocate item 1, then the remainder of the for
loop is simply SimpleGreedy(v,p,M \ {1}). If we do allocate item 1, then the remainder of the for
loop is simply SimpleGreedy(v{1},p,M \ {1}), where vS(T ) := v(S ∪ T )− v(S). Also importantly,
observe that vS(·) is submodular whenever v(·) is submodular (like [35], this is the only part of the
proof which requires submodularity instead of subadditivity).
Now we begin with the base case. Observe that when m = 1, SimpleGreedy purchases the item
if and only if the value exceeds twice the price. So when SimpleGreedy purchases the item, it is
optimal. When SimpleGreedy doesn’t purchase the item, the benchmark is 0 (because we compete
with the optimal utility when the prices are doubled, which is zero). So in both cases, it guarantees
a the required (1/2, 1/2)-approximation. This proves the base case.
Now assume that the proposition holds for a fixed m ≥ 1, and consider the case with m + 1
items. First, observe that if SimpleGreedy does not allocate item 1, it is because v(1) < 2p(1).
By submodularity of v(·) (in fact, subadditivity suffices), this implies that v(S) − 2p(S) > v(S ∪
{1})− 2p(S ∪{1}) for all S ∋ 1 (and in particular, that the optimum when prices are doubled does
not contain item 1). By the inductive hypothesis, SimpleGreedy finds a (1/2, 1/2)-approximation for
v(·) on M \ {1}, which by the previous sentence is also a (1/2, 1/2)-approximation for v(·) on M ,
completing the inductive step in this case.
It remains to consider the case where SimpleGreedy allocates item 1. Let S2 := S \ {1} denote
the set output by SimpleGreedy(v{1},p,M \ {1}), and let O∗ := argmax{v(Y ) − 2p(Y )} be the
optimum bundle if prices were doubled. Then the inductive hypothesis guarantees:
v{1}(S2)− p(S2) ≥ v{1}(O∗)/2− p(O∗ \ {1}).
Suppose first 1 ∈ O∗. The inductive hypothesis then implies:
v(O∗)/2 − p(O∗) = v{1}(O∗)/2− p(O∗ \ {1}) + v({1})/2 − p({1})
≤ v{1}(S2)− p(S2) + v({1})/2 − p({1})
≤ v(S)− p(S).
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Above, the first and third lines are simply expanding the definition of v{1}(·), and the second
line follows by inductive hypothesis. Observe that this concludes a (1/2, 1/2)-approximation in the
case that 1 ∈ O∗. Now, suppose instead that 1 /∈ O∗. Then we have:
v(O∗)/2 − p(O∗) ≤ v(O∗ ∪ {1})/2 − p(O∗) = v{1}(O∗)/2 + v({1})/2 − p(O∗)
≤ v{1}(S2)− p(S2) + v({1})/2
≤ v{1}(S2)− p(S2) + v({1}) − p(1)
= v(S)− p(S).
Above, the first line follows by monotonicity and expanding the definition of v{1}(·). The second
line follows by inductive hypothesis. The third line follows as v({1}) ≥ 2p(1) by assumption that
SimpleGreedy allocates item 1. The final line follows again by expanding v{1}(·). This concludes
both cases of the inductive step, and the proof of the proposition.
This concludes our development of bicriterion approximate demand oracles. The following
section establishes that a wide class of posted-price mechanisms that achieve good guarantees
when buyers use precise demand queries maintain their guarantees when buyers follow advice given
by bicriterion approximate demand oracles.
4 Welfare Guarantees with Approximate Demand Oracles
In this section, we demonstrate that a slight modification of the O((log logm)3) approximation of [1]
(which is truthful when buyers implement precise demand oracles) maintains its approximation
guarantee when buyers follow advice recommended by a (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracle. We
begin with the main insight below, followed by a precise statement of our main result.
4.1 Fixed Price Auctions with Approximate Demand Oracles
A key component of the [1] (and related) auctions is the notion of a Fixed Price Auction. A fixed
price auction simply sets a price p(j) on item j, visits the buyers one at a time, and offers the
buyer the option to purchase any set S of remaining items for price p(S) (so it is a posted-price
mechanism which sets the same prices for all bidders).
A key lemma used by these works establishes that there exists a fixed price auction generating
good welfare (when bidders implement exact demand oracles) for any instance with submodular
bidders (or even XOS bidders).6 One can view the [16, 1] auctions as attempting to learn such a
“good” fixed price auction. The key intuition behind our extension is that good fixed price auctions
still exist when bidders only implement approximate demand oracles. This is captured formally by
Lemma 4.3 below, which first requires the notion of supporting prices.
Definition 4.1. q are supporting prices for v1(·), . . . , vn(·) and allocation S1, . . . , Sn if:
• For all i, T , vi(T ) ≥ q(Si ∩ T ).
• For all i, vi(Si) = q(Si).
Fact 4.2. When all vi(·) are XOS, supporting prices exist for any allocation S1, . . . , Sn.7
6This lemma appears at least as early as [18].
7Recall that submodular functions are XOS, and a function is XOS if it can be written as the maximum of additive
functions. Supporting prices for items in Si are defined by simply taking the additive function which defines vi(Si).
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Much prior work leverages the fact that with precise demand queries, the fixed-price auction
with prices q/2 achieves half the optimal welfare. The intuition for our main result is that this key
lemma extends to (c, d)-approximate demand queries by losing an additional min{c, d} factor. In
the statement below, we will slightly abuse notation and say that a bidder “follows advice given by a
(c, d)-approximate demand oracle” if they follow advice given by an algorithm which on input v(·), S
computs a (c, d)-approximate demand query T , then advises argmax{v(S)− p(S), v(T ) − p(T )}.
Lemma 4.3. Let q be supporting prices for v1(·), . . . , vn(·) and S1, . . . , Sn. Then the fixed-price
auction with prices dq/2 guarantees welfare at least min{c, d} ·∑i vi(Si)/2 when all bidders follow
advice given by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle.
Proof. Let S := ∪iSi. Let also Ti denote the set purchased by bidder i (following advice given
by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle), and denote by Sold =
⋃
i∈N Ti. Define Ai = Si \ Sold.
Because items in Ai are never allocated when bidder i is chosen to act (meaning that bidder i could
choose to purchase the set Ai), and bidder i will choose a set guaranteeing at least as much utility
as a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle, we have:
vi(Ti)− dq(Ti)/2 ≥ c
(
vi(Ai)− dq(Ai)/2
d
)
= c
(
vi(Ai)− 1
2
q(Ai)
)
.
The welfare achieved (
∑
i∈N vi(Ti)) is exactly the sum of the utilities of each bidder (vi(Ti) −
dq(Ti)/2) and the total revenue of the auction (
∑
i∈N dq(Ti)/2 = dq(Sold)/2). By the definition
of supporting prices (and the fact that Ai ⊆ Si), we know that vi(Ai) ≥ q(Ai). Thus:
d
2
q(Sold) +
n∑
i=1
vi(Ti)− d
2
q(Ti) ≥ d
2
q(Sold) + c
(
n∑
i=1
vi(Ai)− 1
2
q(Ai)
)
≥ d
2
q(Sold) +
c
2
n∑
i=1
q(Ai)
≥ min{c, d}
2
(
q(Sold) + q(S \ Sold))
≥ min{c, d}
2
q(S) =
min{c, d}
2
∑
i
vi(Si).
The first inequality follows as each bidder follows advice of a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle.
The second follows as vi(Ai) ≥ q(Ai) for all i (by definition of supporting prices). The third follows
as ∪iAi = S \Sold. The final inequality follows by basic arithmetic, and the final equality follows
as q(S) =
∑
i vi(Si) by definition of supporting prices.
Lemma 4.3 captures the main intuition for why existing posted-price guarantees can be extended
to accommodate bicriterion approximate demand queries. Of course, the [1] mechanism is not just
a single posted-price mechanism, and Lemma 4.3 is just one technical lemma used along the way
(to be more precise, a generalization of Lemma 4.3 is used along the way, but the overly technical
statement hides the intuition). But an outline similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3 establishes the
more general claim. Section 4.2 formally states our main result, and all details of the proof aside
from the above intuition can be found in Appendix B.
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4.2 Formal Statement of Main Result
Theorem 4.4. Let V be a subclass of XOS valuations and let D be a poly-time (c, d)-approximate
demand oracle for valuation class V. Then there exists a poly-time mechanism for welfare maxi-
mization when all valuations are in V with approximation guarantee O (max {1c , 1d} · (log logm)3)
in implementation in advised strategies with polynomial time computable advice.
Theorem 1.1 now follows from Theorem 4.4 as submodular valuations are a subclass of XOS
which admits poly-time (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracles. The poly-time mechanism witness-
ing Theorem 4.4 is a slight modification of [1]. The high-level approach of their mechanism is
the following: because V is XOS, Lemma 4.3 establishes that there exists a fixed-price mechanism
which achieves an 1/O(min{c, d}) = O(max {1/c, 1/d}) approximation in implementation in ad-
vised strategies. Of course, implementing this fixed-price auction requires complete knowledge of
v1(·), . . . , vn(·), which the seller lacks. The mechanism of [1] essentially tries to iteratively guess a
better and better set of fixed prices, and then pick one uniformly at random.
Intuitively, our adapted [1] mechanism works with (c, d)-approximated demand oracles for the
same reason that Lemma 4.3 works with approximate demand oracles. Formally establishing this
requires a bit of work, but much of the analysis of [1] treats the (c, d) = (1, 1) case of Lemma 4.3
as a black box, and therefore we can leverage most of their analysis as a black box as well. The
generalized Lemma 4.3 (Lemma B.2) provides all the properties of demand queries which their proof
requires (and all the properties of approximate demand queries which our adaptation requires). A
complete proof appears in Appendix B.
5 Approximate Demand Queries beyond Submodular
In this section, we explore approximate demand queries beyond submodular valuation functions.
As the approximation guarantees of [1] hold for XOS valuations with precise demand queries, a
poly-time (Ω(1),Ω(1))-approximate demand query would immediately extend their guarantees to
XOS valuations under implementation in advised strategies. Interestingly, this very fact establishes
that for all ε > 0, no poly-time (Ω(m−1/2+ε),Ω(m−1/2+ε))-approximate demand oracle exists for
XOS valuations using subexponentially-many value queries.
Proposition 5.1. For all ε > 0, there is no (Ω(m−1/2+ε,Ω(m−1/2+ε))-approximate demand oracle
for XOS valuations using poly(m) value queries.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the proposition were false. Then by Theorem 4.4, there
exists an algorithm using poly(n,m) value queries that approximates the optimal welfare within
O
(
m1/2−ε · (log logm)3) ∈ O(m1/2−ε/2) for XOS valuations. However, Theorem 6.1 of [19] proves
that no such algorithm exists.
To complete the picture, we also design poly-time (Ω(1/
√
m),Ω(1/
√
m))-approximate demand
oracles for subadditive valuations (defined immediately below, based on the Ω(1/
√
m)-approximation
of [19]), which is the best possible using subexponentially-many value queries.
Proposition 5.2. SingleOrBundle(v,p,M) is a ( 1√
m
, 1
1+
√
m
)-approximate demand oracle for sub-
additive valuation functions.
Proof. Let S be the set that maximizes utility (v(S) − (1 + √m) · p(S)). If S = ∅, then the
benchmark is 0, and SingleOrBundle achieves non-negative utility. It remains to consider the case
v(S)− p(S) > 0.
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Algorithm 2 SingleOrBundle(v,p,M)
j ← argmaxj∈M v(j) − p(j)
M∗ ← {j ∈M : v(j) − (1 +√m)p(j) > 0}
if v(M∗)− p(M∗) > v(j) − p(j) then
return M∗
else
return {j}
In this case, let T be the set returned by SingleOrBundle(v,p,M). Call an item j special if:
v(j) − p(j) ≥ 1√
m
(v(S)− (1 +√m) · p(S)).
Observe that if any item j is special, then we conclude:
v(T )− p(T ) ≥ v(j) − p(j) ≥ 1√
m
(v(S) − (1 +√m) · p(S)),
which is a ( 1√
m
, 1
1+
√
m
)-approximate demand oracle. If no item is special, then ∀j ∈ M∗, v(j) −
p(j) < 1√
m
(v(S)− (1 +√m)p(S)). Summing this for all j ∈M∗ yields:
∑
j∈M∗
v(j)

 − p(M∗) < |M∗|√
m
(v(S) − (1 +√m) · p(S)) ≤ √m · v(S) ≤ √m · v(M∗). (1)
The final inequality follows as S cannot contain items for which v(j) < (1 +
√
m)p(j), as v(·) is
subadditive. We can then conclude that:
v(M∗)− p(M∗) > 1√
m



∑
j∈M∗
v(j)

 − p(M∗)

− p(M∗)
=
1√
m

∑
j∈M∗
v(j) − (1 +√m)p(j)


≥ 1√
m

∑
j∈S
v(j) − (1 +√m)p(j)


≥ 1√
m
(
v(S)− (1 +√m)p(S)) .
The first inequality follows directly from (1). The second follows as v(j) > (1 +
√
m)p(j) for all
j ∈ M∗, and S ⊆ M∗ (because v(·) is subadditive, and S is the utility-maximizing set at prices
(1 +
√
m)p). The third follows from subadditivity of v(·). We conclude that when there are no
special items, the proposition is satisfied as well, completing the proof.
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A Brief Discussion of Definitions
The following example will motivate our decision to think of advice as improving a given strategy
as opposed to outright proposing a replacement strategy.
Consider, for example, a single-bidder mechanism where the bidder faces one of k posted-price
vectors p1, . . . ,pk chosen uniformly at random, and is asked to submit their desired sets S1, . . . , Sk
before knowing which price is “real.” Then the strategy which submits Si := argmax{v(S)−pi(S)}
is dominant. In this case, advice could indeed simply propose this strategy to replace whatever else
the bidder might try.
Things get more interesting, however, if the designer cannot recommend a dominant strat-
egy. Consider instead a recommended strategy T1, . . . , Tk where Ti /∈ argmax{v(S) − pi(S)} ∪
argmin{v(S) − pi(S)} for any i (call this strategy ~T ). If the designer shares the sets T1, . . . , Tk
with the buyer, a reasonable buyer should certainly submit sets Si satisfying v(Si) − pi(Si) ≥
v(Ti) − pi(Ti) for all i (because they could just swap any set violating this for Ti and strictly im-
prove their utility). Consider then the strategy which sets Sj ∈ argmax{v(S)−pj(S)} (for a single
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j ∈ [k]) and Si ∈ argmin{v(S)−pi(S)} for all i 6= j (picks the optimal set for pj , and worst possible
sets for all other pi, call this strategy ~S). We don’t want to say that a bidder originally planning
to use ~S should instead use ~T (indeed, ~T does not dominate ~S, and it’s not a priori clear which
strategy yields higher expected utility). But we do want to say that a bidder originally planning
to use ~S should stick with Sj, and update Si to Ti for all i 6= j. But in order to recommend such
a strategy without knowing j in advance, ~T would need to be the dominant strategy itself. So in
order for the solution concept to meaningfully apply to posted-price mechanisms without advising
the dominant strategy itself, advice should really take the form of improving a tentative strategy
rather than outright recommending a replacement. Lemma B.11 below provides a representative
example of how this solution concept can be harnessed for existing state-of-the-art mechanisms.
B Proof of Theorem 4.4
The full definition of “implementation in advised strategies” is very powerful, but a bit awkward
to carry around. Throughout this appendix, we use the following definition of (c, d)-competitive
sets, which simply says that a set of items will give the bidder utility at least as high as a (c, d)-
approximate demand oracle.
Definition B.1. A set S is a (c, d)-competitive subset of M for vi with prices p if
vi(S)− p(S) ≥ c · max
T⊆M
{vi(T )− p(T )/d} .
We say a bidder i picks (c, d) competitive sets in a fixed price auction if, when the fixed price
auction visits i, they pick a set which is a (c, d)-competitive subset of the collection of remaining
items.
The full proof of theorem 4.4 is fairly involved. We start off this section by providing the
more technical version of lemma 4.3 in section B.1, which captures most of the properties of fixed
price auctions with approximate demand queries which we need. Next in section B.2, we describe
the “core algorithm” PriceLearningMechanism of [1]. Then in section B.3, using fairly elementary
properties of fixed-price auctions, we prove the correctness of the PriceLearningMechanism, as long
as 1) bidders pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in, and 2)
we make the simplifying assumption B.3. In section B.4, we remove the simplifying assumption,
and prove that there exists poly time computable advice such that, when bidders are following the
advice, they always pick (c, d)-competitive sets.
B.1 Generalization of Lemma 4.3
In this subsection we state and prove the generalization of Lemma 4.3, which will be used in the
analysis of the PriceLearningMechanism.
The first term in the maximum below (and the “moreover” part of the lemma) relates the
achieved welfare with the value of the unsold items, and will be used to handle “learning” phases
in the mechanism. The second term of the maximum shows that once we have learned the prices
well, we definitely get good welfare.
Lemma B.2. Suppose {Ti}i∈N ← FixedPriceAuction(M,N, dp), where each bidder i picks a subset
of the remaining items which is (c, d)-competitive set for vi with prices p. Let {Oi}i∈N be any
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allocation with supporting prices q. Let Si be the set of items j where δq(j) ≤ p(j) ≤ 12q(j) and
j ∈ Oi. Denote S =
⋃
i∈N Si and Sold =
⋃
i Ti. Then
∑
i
vi(Ti) ≥ max
{
c
2 · q(S \ Sold),
min
(
c
2 , δd
) · q(S).
Moreover, suppose k is the last bidder in N . We also have vi(Tk) ≥ c2q(Sk \ Sold<k), where
Sold<k =
⋃
i<k Ti.
Proof. Let Ai = Si \ Sold. Because items in Ai are never allocated when bidder i is chosen to act
(and because each bidder picks a (c, d)-competitive set with prices p), the utility of each bidder i
satisfies
vi(Ti)− d · p(Ti) ≥ c · (vi(Ai)− p(Ai)) .
As Ai ⊆ Si, we know δq(Ai) ≤ p(Ai) ≤ 12q(Ai), and by the definition of supporting prices, we
know that q(Ai) ≤ vi(Ai) Thus, {Ti}i∈N achieves welfare∑
i∈N
vi(Ti) =
∑
i∈N
(
vi(Ti)− d · p(Ti)
)
+ d
∑
i∈N
p(Ti)
≥ c
∑
i∈N
(
vi(Ai)− p(Ai)
)
+ d · p(Sold)
≥
∑
i
c(q(Ai)− 1
2
q(Ai)) + dδ · q(Sold). (*)
Observe that S \ Sold = ⋃i∈N Ai. Thus, ignoring the term dδq(Sold) from (*), we can
conclude the auction gets welfare at least c2q(S \ Sold). Moreover, (*) tells us we get welfare at
least
min
( c
2
, δd
)
· (q(S \ Sold) + q(Sold)) ≥ min( c
2
, δd
)
· q(S),
from which we can conclude main statement of the lemma.
For the “moreover” component, simply observe that when bidder k was picked by the mecha-
nism, the items in A′ := Sk \ Sold<k were still available, and that Sk ⊆ Ok, so
vi(Tk) ≥ vi(Tk)− dp(Tk) ≥ c(vi(A′)− p(A′)) ≥ c(q(A′)− q(A′)/2) = c
2
q(A′).
B.2 The Mechanism
For the reader’s convenience, we first briefly describe the mechanism in [1] and quote the mech-
anism verbatim (the only change we need to make is that every price used by the mechanism
is “discounted” by an extra factor of d, plus some slight simplifications in the “removing extra
assumptions” step). Then we present a slightly condensed version of the analysis.
High-level overview Posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions typically use the fol-
lowing high-level strategy: attempt to (approximately) learn the supporting prices (definition 4.1)
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[1, γ] [γ2, γ3] [γ4, γ5] [γ6, γ7] [γ8, γ9] [γ10, γ11][γ12, γ13][γ14, γ15]
1 γ4 γ8 γ12
1 γ8
1
[1, Figure 2] An illustration of a price tree T e with α = 2, β = 3, and ψmin = 1.
of an optimal allocation, then sell the items at those prices. The key innovation of [1] is to “ex-
plore” prices for each item individually using a price tree in which each successive layer of the tree
corresponds to a finer “granularity” of prices. Initially, each item is set at a price corresponding to
the root of the tree, and in each successive round of the mechanism, the price of each item moves
one layer down in the tree to a “more precise” price which corresponds to some child node of the
old price.
The mechanism of [1] runs several fixed-price auctions for each round (i.e. each layer of the
price tree). In each of these successive auctions, each item is priced higher and higher in a way
corresponding to the children of the “old” price node of the item. The price in the next round of
the mechanism is then the highest price in the next layer where the item was still sold. The idea
here is that, in the next layer of prices, we need to make the prices as high as possible such that
the items will still sell. Intuitively, this serves to refine our estimate for the supporting prices as
we move a layer down in the tree.
In fact, the story is more subtle than this. The mechanism may not actually achieve a better
approximation to the prices in each layer, but [1] prove that if you do not get a better estimate for the
prices, then you can already get a good approximation to the optimal welfare at the current prices.
These two cases exactly correspond to the “learnable” or “allocatable” cases in lemma B.4 below.
For this reason, for every layer of the price tree, the mechanism has some chance (proportional to the
number of layers) of stopping early and allocating the items according to some fixed price auction
in that layer. Thus, regardless of whether we always learn prices or if we hit the “allocatable” in
some step, we will use a good auction with some probability.
Simplifying Assumption It’s useful for posted price mechanisms to know ahead of time the
range of possible supporting prices of an optimal allocation. This assumption can be removed in a
fairly “modular” way, as done in [1] (though we make some modifications in order to more easily
fit our solution concept).
Let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation. Formally, our simplifying assumption
is the following:
Assumption B.3. There are known numbers ψmin, ψmax such that the supporting prices of any
item in q are either 0 or in [ψmin, ψmax], and ψmax/ψmin is polynomial in m.
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The price tree and mechanism parameters We now formally describe the price tree in
terms of three parameters:
• α = Θ(1) is the branching factor of the tree (and the number of auctions in each iteration of
the mechanism).
• β = Θ(log log(ψmax/ψmin)) = Θ(log logm) is the number of layers in the price tree (and the
number of iterations of the mechanism).
• γ = Θ(αβ) = Θ(log logm) is the “accuracy factor” of the prices.
We would like the leaves of the price tree correspond to “price buckets”
P = {[ψminγi, ψminγi+1] | i = 0, 1, . . . , k}
for some k large enough that all prices in [ψmin, ψmax] are considered. Informally, we take “learning
a price q correctly” to mean that we find the bucket in P to which q belongs. We will assign “actual”
prices in p according to the smallest price ψminγ
i in the corresponding bucket. Our goal is that, if
we “learn the price of q correctly”, then the price used in p is within a γ factor of the true price
in q.
However, for technical reasons, we need a gap of at least γ between the prices of consecutive
nodes in each layer of the tree (not just the leaves), so that prices will be guided to the closest leaf
node below the price in q (this is desirable because lemma B.2 requires prices in p to be less than
in q). To ensure this, the mechanism creates a price gap of factor γ between nodes by splitting P
into
P o = {[ψminγ2k−1, ψminγ2k] |k = 1, . . . , αβ}
P e = {[ψminγ2k, ψminγ2k+1] |k = 0, . . . , αβ − 1}
Trees T o and T e are constructed with leaf nodes P o and P e respectively. We use T ∗ to denote
either of T o or T e, and P ∗ will denote the corresponding P o or P e.
The price tree T ∗ is an α-branching tree with depth β (i.e. with β + 1 layers). The leaf nodes
correspond, in left-to-right (depth-first search) order, to the price buckets in P ∗ (in increasing
order). Furthermore, any non-leaf node x corresponding to a single price, which is the minimum
value in any bucket of any leaf node which is a descendant of x. Thus, the prices corresponding to
consecutive level-i nodes differ by a factor of γ2α
β+1−i
.
Let p be a “level-i price vector”, i.e. a vector in which the price of each item is a price which
corresponds to some level-i node. We let next
(i)
j (p) = p
′ denote the price vector constructed as
follows: for each item ℓ ∈ M , let x be the level-i node whose corresponding price is p(ℓ). Then
set p′(ℓ) to the price corresponding to the jth child node of x. Thus, a precise formula is given
by p′(ℓ) = γ2αβ−i(j−1)p(ℓ). In words, next(i)j (p) sets the price of each item ℓ to be the jth largest
“refined price” below the current price of item ℓ.
The mechanism We start by randomly picking a price tree T o or T e. The mechanism then
proceeds in β iterations (though it may terminate early) in which a price vector p(i) is constructed
in each iteration i. Initially, p(1) is the (unique) level-1 price vector of T ∗. In each iteration, a
1
10β fraction of the bidders are selected uniformly at random, and the α different price vectors
p
(i)
j = next
(i)
j (p
(i)) for j = 1, . . . , α are considered. The mechanism runs fixed price auction with
the current set of bidders on prices dp
(i)
j /2 for j = 1, . . . , α. The new (level-(i+1)) vector p
(i+1) is
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then constructed as follows: for each item ℓ, p(i+1)(ℓ) = p
(i)
j (ℓ), where j is the highest index such
that item ℓ sold in the auction with prices dp
(i)
j /2. (or p
(i)(ℓ) if no such j exists). In words, the
new price of ℓ is the price of ℓ in the highest auction in iteration i for which item ℓ was sold. For
each fixed price auction described in this paragraph, there is a 1/Ω(αβ) chance that the mechanism
will terminate early and return the allocation determined by the auction. This serves to strictly
incentivizes bidder to pick good sets, but also serves an important purpose for achieving the desired
approximation grantee, as discussed in the overview.
If the mechanism does not terminate early in iteration 1, . . . , β, then the final step of the
mechanism is to run a fixed price auction with all of the remaining bidders on prices dp(β)/2. (The
hope is that, for a large fraction (weighted by q) of the items, the price of the items is in the level-β
bin which is closest to the price in q, and thus we can apply lemma B.2.)
The exact mechanism in [1] is quoted in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 PriceLearningMechanism(N,M)
1: procedure Partition(N)
2: Permute N uniformly at random.
3: for i = 1, 2, ..β do
4: Remove |N |10β bidders uniformly at random from N ; assign them to the set Ni.
5: Put the remaining items in N into Nβ+1.
6: procedure PriceUpdate(A1,. . . ,Aα, p1,. . . ,pα)
7: For each ℓ ∈M , let p′(ℓ) = pj(ℓ) for the
8: highest value of j such that ℓ is allocated in Aj (or p1(ℓ) if no j exists)
9: Return p′
10: Let (N1, N2, ...Nβ+1)← Partition(N)
11: Pick one of the modified trees T o or T e uniformly at random and denote it by T ∗
12: Let p(1) be the (unqiue) level-1 (root) price of T ∗
13: for i = 1, . . . , β do
14: For j = 1, . . . , α, let p
(i)
j = next
(i)
j (p
(i))
15: For j = 1, . . . , α: run FixedPriceAuction(Ni, M, dp
(i)
j /2) and let A
(i)
j be the allocation
16: With probability (1/β), pick j∗ ∈ [α] u.a.r. and return A(i)j∗ as the final allocation
17: Otherwise, let p(i+1) ←PriceUpdate(A(i)1 , ..., A(i)α ,p(i)1 , ...,p(i)α ), and continue
18: Run FixedPriceAuction(Nβ+1,M, dp
(β+1)/2) and return the allocation A∗
B.3 The Modified Analysis
Notation. We follow [1] and depart somewhat from conventional notation for the analysis of
the mechanism. We let i denote an iteration of the mechanism, j denote an auction inside some
iterations, b denote a bidder, and ℓ denote an item.
Let O be an optimal allocation with supporting prices q and OPT be the optimal welfare
resulting from allocation O. Let q∗ be q restricted to items whose prices are in some bucket of P ∗.
Let O∗ be the collection of those items. Let N1, . . . , Nβ+1 denote the groups of bidders from the
Partition function. Given (Ni)i and T
∗ as picked by the mechanism, define price vectors q(i) as q∗,
restricted to items which are allocated in O∗ to bidders from Ni, Ni+1, . . . , Nβ+1 (intuitively, we
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restricted attention to items which could still go to the same bidder in A as in O, and give price
0 to items that can no longer be allocated to the right bidder in O). Call item ℓ correctly priced
at iteration i if q(i)(ℓ) is in the bin corresponding to some leaf node which is a child of the node
corresponding to p(i)(ℓ). Let C(i) denote all items priced correctly before iteration i begins. Note
that C(1) = O∗ and that an item can only be in C(i) if it is also in C(j) for j = 1, . . . , i − 1, so
C(1) ⊇ C(2) ⊇ . . . ⊇ C(β+1). We separate C(i) into C(i)1 , C(i)2 , ...C(i)α , where C(i)j is the subset of
items in C(i) that are priced correctly in next
(i)
j (p
(i)). For any set of bidders N ′ and items D, let
ODN ′ be the restriction of O
∗ to items in D and bidders in N ′.
Assumptions. Throughout the claims in this section, we assume all bidders pick (c, d)-competitive
sets in every fixed price auction they participate in, though we may not restate this assumption in
every claim statement8. We also assume that the optimal allocation O has supporting prices q.
The following lemma is the heart of the proof of the approximation ratio of mechanism 3. For
the reader’s convenience, we highlight the differences between our proof and the proof
in [1] in blue.
Lemma B.4 (Learnable-Or-Allocable Lemma from [1]). Assume B.3, and suppose all bidders pick
(c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in. For any iteration i ∈ [β],
conditioned on any outcome of first i− 1 iterations and choice of T ∗,
1. either E
[
q(i+1)(C(i+1))
] ≥ q(i)(C(i))− OPT3β , where the expectation is over Ni;
2. or E
[
val(Aj∗)
(i)
] ≥ c
O(αβ2)
OPT .
First we prove a series of claims before proving the Learnable-Or-Allocable lemma, following
the same outline as [1]. For claims B.5 and B.6, we fix some j ∈ [α] and let D = C(i)j . Note that
q(i)(C
(i)
j ) = q
(i)(ODN≥i), as q
(i) zeros out items allocated in O to bidders from N<i.
Claim B.5. (5.3 from [1]) Deterministically, val(A
(i)
j ) ≥ c2 · q(i)(ODNi \A
(i)
j ).
Proof. Recall that ODNi is the restriction of O
∗ to items in C(i)j and bidders in Ni. The definition
of item ℓ being “priced correctly” means that p(i)(ℓ) ≤ q(i)(ℓ). Thus, for any ℓ ∈ ODNi we get that
0 · q(i)(ℓ) ≤ dp(i)(ℓ)/2 ≤ q(i)(ℓ)/2. Thus, the claim follows from lemma B.2.
Claim B.6. (5.4 from [1]) By randomness of choice of Ni from N≥i, E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ ( c20β ) ·
E
[
q(i)(ODN>i \ A(i)j )
]
.
Proof. Consider picking a bidder k ∈ N>i uniformly at random and running an imaginary fixed
price auction on Ni∪{k}, where k is the last bidder chosen to act. Then by Lemma B.2 (parameters
in the lemma take values N = Ni ∪ {k}, Sold<k = A(i)j , Sk = ODk ), the value bidder k gets from
the imaginary fixed price auction satisfy vk(Tk) ≥ c2 · q(i)(ODk \A
(i)
j ). We now take the expectation
8 It is somewhat easier to prove that PriceLearningMechanism is implementable in advised strategies compared
to GeneralizedMechanism below. However, we hold off and only demonstrate that GeneralizedMechanism is im-
plementable in advised strategies, both for completeness, and in order to demonstrate that our solution concept
“composes well” to be useful for complicated mechanisms.
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over the randomness on bidders Ni ∪ k,
E
Ni,k∈N>i
[vk(Tk)] ≥ c
2
· E
Ni,k∈N>i
[
q(i)(ODk \A(i)j )
]
=
c
2
· E
Ni

 1
|N>i| ·
∑
k∈N>i
q(i)(ODk \ A(i)j )


=
1
|N>i| ·
c
2
·E
[
q(i)(ODN>i \ A
(i)
j )
]
.
Observe that the expectation of val(A
(i)
j ) is the same as the expected welfare of bidders in Ni
in the imaginary fixed price auction. Since the bidders in Ni arrive before bidder k, their expected
welfare in the imaginary fixed price auction is larger equal to that of bidder k. Thus by linearity
of expectation
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ |Ni||N>i| ·
c
2
·E
[
q(i)(ODN>i \A
(i)
j )
]
≥
(
c
20β
)
· E
[
q(i)(ODN>i \ A
(i)
j )
]
.
Claim B.7. (5.2 from [1]) For any j, we have
22β
c
· E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j ∩A(i)j )
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j )
]
.
Proof. By combining Claim B.5 and B.6, we have(
20β
c
+
2
c
)
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(ODN>i \ A(i)j )
]
+ E
[
q(i)(ODNi \ A
(i)
j )
]
= E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j \A(i)j )
]
.
Because ODN≥i is exactly C
(i)
j . Thus, we get
20β + 2
c
·E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j ∩A(i)j )
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j )
]
.
The previous claim can be thought of as a preliminary version of the entire learnable-or-
allocatable lemma. In expectation, we get something comparable to the items which are correctly
priced in auction j of round i (i.e. q(i)(C
(i)
j )). The contribution come from either the items which
sold in the round they were “supposed to” (i.e. C
(i)
j ∩A(i)j ) or the welfare of the current allocation
(i.e. A
(i)
j ) (with an extra O(β) factor). The previous claims dealt with individual auctions within
an iteration – next we handle iterations as a whole.
We still have to account for two things: items which sell in auctions where the prices are too
high and the loss in welfare from the fact that bidders in Ni will no longer be allocated items in
later rounds. The proofs in [1] hold as written – only the properties of the price tree and the
structure of the auctions are used.
Claim B.8. (5.5 from [1])
q(i)(C(i+1)) ≥
α∑
j=1
q(i)(A
(i)
j ∩ C(i)j )−
OPT
10β
.
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Proof. The key observation here is that the set of “overpriced” items represent a small fraction
of the optimal revenue. Let U be the set of items that are allocated in FixedPriceAuction with
price above their correct price in round i. The set of items that are allocated in the correct round
but not priced correctly is exactly
(⋃
j A
(i)
j ∩ C(i)j
)
\ C(i+1). This must be a subset of U . Thus,
q(i)(C(i+1)) ≥∑αj=1 q(i)(A(i)j ∩ C(i)j )− q(U).
Consider an allocation that gives all items in U to the bidder in the highest priced auction where
it is ever allocated. Such an allocation must give welfare ≤ OPT , but ≥ γq(i)(U) due to the price
gap in the tree structure. Thus q(i)(U) ≤ 1γOPT ≤ OPT10β (by choosing γ = θ(log logm) ≥ 10β)
.
Claim B.9. (5.6 from [1])
E
[
q(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(C(i+1))
]
− OPT
10β
.
Proof. This follows simply from the fact that q(i+1) is exactly q(i) with items corresponding (under
O) to bidders in Ni set to zero, and that bidders join Ni with probability 1/(10β).
Proof. (of Learnable or Allocable Lemma : Lemma B.4)
By Claim B.8 and B.9,
E
[
q(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥
α∑
j=1
E
[
q(i)(A
(i)
j ∩ C(i)j )
]
− OPT
5β
, (2)
We now have two cases. First, assume
α∑
j=1
E
[
q(i)(A
(i)
j ∩C(i)j )
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(C(i))
]
− 2
15β
OPT. (3)
Together with (2) this immediately implies that
E
[
q(i+1)(C(i+1))
]
≥ E
[
q(i)(C(i))
]
− OPT
3β
.
and we are in the “learnable case”.
On the other hand, if equation (3) is false, then we can sum the inequality in claim B.7 for each
j = 1, . . . , α to get
E
[
q(i)(C(i))
]
≤ 22β
c
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+
α∑
j=1
E
[
q(i)(C
(i)
j ∩A(i)j )
]
<
22β
c
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
+ E
[
q(i)(C(i))
]
− 2
15β
OPT.
Thus
22β
c
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ 2
15β
·OPT
⇒ E
[
val(A
(i)
j∗ )
]
=
1
α
α∑
j=1
E
[
val(A
(i)
j )
]
≥ 2c
22 ∗ 15αβ2 · OPT =
c
O(αβ2)
· OPT.
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and we are in the “allocatable” case.
Theorem 4.4 now follows readily follow from the Learnable or Allocable Lemma.
Theorem B.10. Suppose ψmin and ψmax are given and satisfy assumption B.3. Suppose the opti-
mal allocation O has supporting prices q, and suppose bidders pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every
fixed price auction they participate in. Then mechanism 3 achieves an O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
} · (log logm)3)
approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof. Note that by the Learnable or Allocable Lemma, in the mechanism there are only two
situation that can occur, 1) event E1: “learnable” occurs in every iteration i = 1, 2, ...β, or 2) event
E2: “allocable” occurs in some iteration k. Denote the welfare from the mechanism as Welf . Then
E [Welf ] satisfy the equation
E [Welf ] ≥ min
(
E [Welf | E1] ,E [Welf | E2]
)
.
Now we bound E [Welf | E1] and E [Welf | E2], respectively.
• Suppose that “learnable” occurs for each iteration i = 1, 2, ...β in the mechanism. Because
C(1) consist of items whose prices belong to the bins of P ∗, we know that E
[
q(1)(C(1))
]
=
OPT/2. Thus,
E
[
qβ+1(Cβ+1)
]
≥ E
[
q(1)(C(1))− OPT
3
]
=
OPT
2
− OPT
3
=
OPT
6
.
Let Wβ+1 be the welfare achieved when the mechanism allocate in the last iteration of fixed
price auction. Since for any correctly priced item j ∈ C(β+1), 12q(j) ≥ p(j) ≥ 1γq(j), by
lemma B.2, Wβ+1 ≥ min
(
c
2 ,
d
γ
)
·E [qβ+1(Cβ+1)] = O (min(c, dβ)) ·OPT .
It’s easy to verify that the mechanism allocates in last iteration with constant probability.
Thus, in this case we get E [Welf |E1] at least O
(
min
(
c, dβ
))
· OPT .
• In the case where “learnable” does not occur for some iteration i, “allocable” must occur at
this iteration. Thus
E
[
val(A
(i)
j∗ )
]
=
c
O(αβ2)
· OPT.
The mechanism allocate in iteration i with probability (1 − 1/β)i−1 · 1/β = O(1/β), thus in
this case E [Welf | E2] is at least cO(αβ3) ·OPT .
Since β = Θ(log logm), we conclude that mechanism M achieves an approximation ratio of
O
(
max
(
1
c
,
β
d
,
αβ3
c
))
= max
(
1
c
,
1
d
)
· O(log logm)3.
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B.4 Removing Assumptions
In this section we prove Theorem 4.4 in full generality by 1) removing the assumption that the
supporting price lies in {0} ∪ [ψmin, ψmax], where ψmax/ψmin = poly(m), and 2) showing that this
generalized mechanism can be implemented in advised strategies. We use a similar (but slightly
simplified) extension to PriceLearningMechanism following previous work on truthful mechanisms
for XOS bidders [14, 20, 16, 1]9. Our variation both simplifies the analysis and allows us to satisfy
the formal definition of implementation in advised strategies more easily.
The final mechanism is as follows.
Algorithm 4 GeneralizedMechanism(N, M):
1: Pick a subset of bidders Nstat ⊆ N by sampling each bidder in N independently and with
probability 12 . Let Nmech = N \Nstat.
2: Run a second price auction on the grand bundle M with bidders in Nstat. Let SPA be the
welfare of the resulting allocation. With probability 12 , return the resulting allocation and
terminate. With the remaining probability, continue.
3: Set ψmin =
1
4m2 · SPA and ψmax = 4m · SPA.
4: Run PriceLearningMechanism (Mechanism 3) on bidders in Nmech with ψmin and ψmax and
return the allocation.
First, we show that implementation in advised strategies allows us to force bidders to play
truthfully in the second-price auction of mechanism 4, and to pick (c, d)-competitive sets in the
PriceLearningMechanism.
Lemma B.11. Suppose we are given a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle D for valuations V. Then
there exists a useful poly-time computable advice A for mechanism 4 such that, if a strategy s is
advised for vi under A, then any bidder in Nstat will play truthfully in the second price auction, and
any bidder in Nmech will pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in.
Proof. As in prior works [1, 14, 16], to formally meet our solution concept we need all actions
by a single bidder to happen simultaneously in order to preclude bidders from “threatening” each
other (for example, if a different bidder will only let me have items in future auctions if I lie in
the current auction, then truthful play does not dominate lying). Thus, we formally implement
GeneralizedMechanism as a game where each bidder can act in exactly one node. If the bidder is
assigned in Nstat, the mechanisms simultaneously asks all bidders in Nstat for a single bid on the
grand bundle. If the bidder is put in Nmech, and then into Ni for i < β + 1, then the bidder needs
to participate in α fixed-price auctions simultaneously in a single game node. Thus, the bidder
reports a list (Tj)j=1,...,α of α subsets of M , where Tj is still available in auction j of the mechanism
when it is bidder i’s turn to pick a set. Bidders in Nβ+1 report similarly, but participate in only
one auction.
Recall that the advice function A(vi, x, a) takes as input the valuation function vi of player i,
a node x of the game, and a “tentative” action a which the player may play. The advice works as
follows: for a node x which corresponds to a bidder in Nstat, A can ignore the tentative action a
and recommend truthful play in the second price auction, i.e. A(vi, x, a) = vi(M) in this case. If
x corresponds to a bidder put in Ni ⊆ Nmech for some i < β, then the tentative action a is some
9 Prior works have some probability of selling the grand bundle M in a second price auction (to handle “dominant
bidders”) or running a different algorithm to collect basic “statistics” on the bidders. We combine the two approaches
by using the result of the second price auction to calculate the statistics (at the cost of some loss in the polynomial
factor in assumption B.3).
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list of sets (S1, . . . , Sα) which bidder i may choose in each auction. For each of the α auctions, A
will run the (c, d)-approximate demand query D (with prices and remaining items known from the
node x) to get a sets T1, . . . , Tα. Then, A will return (S
′
1, . . . , S
′
α), where S
′
i is whichever of Si or
Ti that gives bidder i higher utility. The advice behaves similarly for bidders in Nβ+1 ⊆ Nmech.
It’s clear that, if D is computable in poly-time, then A(vi, x, a) is computable in poly-time.
We now show that A is useful (definition 2.4). A satisfies the required idempotency property,
because for bidders in Nstat, the result of A is a constant, and for bidders in Nmech, the result is
given by taking the max of sets Sj with the result of D (which is fixed given bidder’s valuation vi
and a node x of the game).
For any si and for any randomness in the mechanism, it’s clear that A
vi,s gets i utility at least
as high as s. For, if i is in Nstat, then A
vi,s recommends a dominant strategy, and if i is in Nmech,
then the utility of i is completely determined by the unique node in which i is chosen to act, and
Avi,s will differ from s only in selecting sets with higher utility for i. Moreover, if s 6= Avi,s, then
either s and Avi,s differ for some node corresponding to a bidder in Nstat, or s and A
vi,s differ for
some node corresponding to a bidder in Nmech. In the first case, because A
vi,s is dominant, there
exists v−i and random outcomes of the mechanism which get i strictly higher utility. In the second
case, there must be some auction in which the advice Avi,s selects strictly better sets than s, and
because there is positive probability that each auction is the allocation returned by the mechanism,
there are some random outcomes of the mechanism which get the bidder strictly more utility. Thus,
if Avi,s 6= s, then Avi,s dominates s.
Finally, it’s clear that if a bidder plays according to strategy Avi,sfor any s, then if the bidder is
in Nstat then they play truthfully, and if the bidder is in Nmech then they select (c, d)-competitive
sets.
Now, we show that algorithm 4 successfully allows us to remove assumption B.3. Let S be
any set of bidders and let OPT (S) denote the optimal welfare possible for bidders in S. We say
(ψmin, ψmax) is correct for S if ψmin ≤ OPT (S)/m2 and ψmax ≥ OPT (S). We call a bidder i
dominant for a set S if vi(Oi) >
OPT (S)
8 .
Lemma B.12. Let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation of items to bidders in some
set S. If (ψmin, ψmax) is correct for S, then the supporting prices of a (1 − o(1)) fraction of the
items (weighted by their supporting prices) are in the range I = [ψmin, ψmax]. More formally,∑
j∈M 1 [q(j) ∈ I] · q(j) ≥ (1− 1m) ·OPT (S).
Proof. Since ψmax ≥ OPT (S), we know that for all item j, q(j) ∈ [0, ψmax]. Now we count the
sum over supporting prices of items whose supporting price is ≤ OPT (S)/m2.∑
q(j)≤OPT (S)/m2
q(j) ≤ m · OPT (S)/m2 = OPT (S)/m.
Thus ∑
j∈[m]
1 [q(j) ∈ I] · q(j) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
q(j)−
∑
q(j)≤OPT (S)/m2
q(j) ≥
(
1− 1
m
)
· OPT (S).
Corollary B.13. For bidders in S and items inM , if (ψmin, ψmax) is correct for S, and ψmax/ψmin =
poly(m), then PriceLearningMechanism(S,M) returns an allocation with expected welfare 1r · (1 −
1
m) ·OPT (S), where r = O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
.
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Proof. Again let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation of items to bidders in some set
S. Observe that although Theorem B.10 assumes all supporting price to be in 0∪ [ψmin, ψmax], the
proof holds as is for approximating
∑
j∈[m] 1
[
q(j) ∈ [ψmin, ψmax]
]
· q(j) (i.e. the contribution to
the optimal welfare of items whose supporting price is in [ψmin, ψmax]). If (ψmin, ψmax) is correct
for S, then
∑
j∈[m]
1
[
q(j) ∈ [ψmin, ψmax]
]
· q(j) ≥ (1− 1
m
) · OPT (S).
We conclude that PriceLearningMechanism returns an allocation with expected welfare
1
r
·
∑
j∈[m]
1
[
q(j) ∈ [ψmin, ψmax]
]
· q(j) = 1
r
· (1− 1
m
) · OPT (S),
where r = O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
.
The following lemma follows from a standard application of chernoff bound and is quoted
verbatim from [1]. It allows us to show that, with constant probability, a good fraction of the
welfare is achievable by bidders in both Nstat and Nmech.
Lemma B.14. [14, 20, 16, 1] Let O = (O1, ...On) be an optimal allocation of items M to bidders N
with welfare OPT . Suppose we sample each i ∈ N w.p. ρ independently to obtain N ′. If for every
i ∈ N , we have vi(Oi) ≤ ǫ · OPT , then
∑
i∈N ′ vi(Oi) ≥ (ρ/2) · OPT w.p. at least 1− 2 · exp(− ρ2ǫ).
Finally, once the previous lemma has been applied, we will need this lemma to prove that we
set the parameters correctly for PriceLearningMechanism.
Lemma B.15. If Nstat satisfy OPT (Nstat) ≥ 14 · OPT and OPT (Nmech) ≥ 14 · OPT , then
(ψmin, ψmax) is correct for Nmech.
Proof. Assume Nstat satisfy OPT (Nstat) ≥ 14 · OPT and OPT (Nmech) ≥ 14 · OPT . We know that
SPA < OPT (Nstat). Thus
4 ·OPT (Nmech) ≥ OPT ≥ OPT (Nstat) ≥ SPA,
⇒ ψmin = 1
4m2
· SPA ≤ 1
m2
·OPT (Nmech).
Moreover, since SPA is at least the value of M for any bidder in Nstat, we have m · SPA ≥
OPT (Nstat). Thus
ψmax = 4m · SPA ≥ 4 ·OPT (Nstat) ≥ OPT ≥ OPT (Nmech).
We conclude that (ψmin, ψmax) is correct for Nmech.
Theorem B.16. For valuation functions v1, . . . , vn, suppose the optimal allocation O has support-
ing prices q. Let D be a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle for valuation in {v1, . . . , vn}. Then
mechanism 4 with advice A as in lemma B.11 gets a O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
} · (log logm)3) fraction of the
optimal welfare in implementation in advised strategies.
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Proof. Lemma B.11 shows that there exists poly time computable advice such than, whenever a
bidder in Nstat follows advice, they play truthfully, and whenever a bidder in Nmech follows advice,
they pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in.
Recall that a bidder is dominant if they contribute more than a 1/8 fraction of the welfare of
an optimal allocation. Next we show that whether there is a dominant bidder or not, the expected
welfare from GeneralizedMechanism is an O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
approximation to OPT in
implementation in advised strategy with advice B.
• When there is a dominant bidder, then with 12 probability the dominant bidder would be
selected in the Nstat group. Conditioned on this, with
1
2 probability the resulting allocation
from running second price auction on the Nstat group would be realized. Since a dominant
bidder is in Nstat group, the welfare from the second price auction is at least
OPT
8 . Thus the
expected welfare of GeneralizedMechanism, conditioned on there being a dominant bidder, is
at least 12 · 12 · OPT8 = OPT32 .
• When there is no dominant bidder, then by Lemma B.14, OPT (Nstat) ≥ 14 ·OPT with prob-
ability at least 1− 2e−2, which means OPT (Nstat) < 14 ·OPT with probability < 2e−2. Sym-
metrically, O(Nmech) <
1
4 ·OPT with probability < 2e−2. By union bound, both OPT (Nstat)
and OPT (Nmech) is ≥ 14 · OPT with probability at least 1 − 4e−2, which is still a positive,
constant probability.
Let’s call the event where OPT (Nstat) ≥ 14 · OPT and OPT (Nmech) ≥ 14 · OPT the good
event.
By Lemma B.15, if the good event occurs, then (ψmin, ψmax) is correct for Nmech. By
construction in GeneralizedMechanism, ψmax/ψmin = O(m
3). By Corollary B.13, condi-
tioned on ψmin and ψmax begin set correctly and ψmax/ψmin = poly(m), priceLearning-
Mechanism returns an allocation that achieves welfare 1r · (1 − 1m ) · OPT (Nmech), where
r = O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
. Since the good event occurs, OPT (Nmech) ≥ 14 · OPT .
We conclude that conditioned on the good event, the expected welfare from PriceLearning-
Mechanism O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
approximates OPT . As the event “the good event
happens and GeneralizedMechanism runs PriceLearningMechanism in setp 4” occurs with
constant probability, we conclude that Generalized mechanism achieves expected welfare at
least OPT/O
(
max
{
1
c ,
1
d
}
(log logm)3
)
when there is no dominant bidder.
Together with the fact that every allocation for XOS valuation functions has supporting prices,
we immediately get theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4. Let V be a subclass of XOS valuations and let D be a poly-time (c, d)-approximate
demand oracle for valuation class V. Then there exists a poly-time mechanism for welfare maxi-
mization when all valuations are in V with approximation guarantee O (max {1c , 1d} · (log logm)3)
in implementation in advised strategies with polynomial time computable advice.
C Approximate Demand Queries vs. Approximate Welfare Ap-
proximation
As it happens, both SimpleGreedy and SingleOrBundle were inspired by simple known algorithms
for approximate welfare maximization, combined with the following simple observation:
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Proposition C.1. S is the return of a demand query on prices p if and only if (S,M \ S) is a
welfare maximizing bundle for the following two player auction: one bidder has valuation function
v, and the other bidder has additive valuation function given by p.
Proof. The utility of v is v(S)− p(S), which differs from the welfare v(S) + p(M \ S) only by the
constant p(M). So maximizing these two objectives is equivalent.
In particular, SimpleGreedy is exactly the 2-approximation algorithm from [35] played by a
regular bidder and a “price bidder”. SingleOrBundle is similarly inspired by the
√
m approximation
of [19]. However, we show below that approximate demand queries do not, in general, reduce to
approximate welfare maximization.
Example C.2. Consider a budget additive valuation v with value 2 for every item and budget of
2
√
m. That is, v(S) = max{2|S|, 2√m}. Let p have price 1 for each item, i.e. p(S) = |S|. The
result of a demand query on (v,p) is any set of size
√
m, with utility
√
m.
However, consider running an approximate welfare maximization mechanism A with two bid-
ders: one with valuation v(S) for bundle S and one with valuation p(S) for bundle S. The optimal
allocation is to give any S of size exactly
√
m to v, and give the rest of the items to p. This has
welfare m+
√
m. However, the allocation giving every item to p has welfare m. Thus, any constant
factor approximation algorithm (for which no other grantees hold) may return this allocation, as
m+
√
m = (1 + o(1))m.
This corresponds to an approximate demand query giving the bidder the empty set. As this has
zero utility, it will fail to be any factor approximation ration of the optimal.
Moreover, the above example would still go through if we consider a few simple variations on
the reduction given by Proposition C.1. For example, if we discount prices by a constant factor,
say d, it’s still the case that d(m−√m)+2√m = (1+o(1))dm, so a constant-factor approximation
algorithm A might give all items to the “price player”.
Thus, approximate demand queries do not reduce to approximate welfare maximization (at
least not as outlined by Proposition C.1).
D Other Algorithms for approximate demand oracles
Here we give another algorithm for computing a (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracle. Instead
of being inspired by known welfare maximization algorithms, this technique is inspired by known
submodular maximization algorithms. Namely, the algorithm MeetInMiddle below is exactly the
algorithm DeterministicUSM from [7], run on the submodular function f given by f(S) = v(S) −
p(S). When f is a nonnegative (possibly decreasing) submodular function, [7] shows that it gives
a 1/3 approximation to the maximum value of f . Unfortunately, the submodular utility function
we are interested in is possibly negative, so this result does not apply (indeed, it is NP hard to
achieve any nontrivial approximation ration for possibly negative submodular maximization, as we
discussed in section 3).
For SimpleGreedy and SingleOrBundle, we needed to run an existing algorithm with the
“higher” prices p/d to attain a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle for (i.e. a set S for which
v(S) − p(S) ≥ cmaxT v(T ) − p(T )/d). Interestingly, we show that MeetInMiddle need to take
the lower (“discounted”) prices as input in order to provide an approximation guarantee.
We show that
1. For any ǫ > 0, S =MeetInMiddle(v,p,M) is not a (ǫ, ǫ) approximate demand oracle for prices
ǫp (i.e. there exists a valuation function v such that v(S)− ǫp(S) < maxT {v(T ) − p(T )}).
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Algorithm 5 MeetInMiddle(v,p,M)
X ← ∅ and Y ←M
for j = 1, . . . ,m do ⊲ For items in an arbitrary order
Set aj ← v(X ∪ j)− v(X) − p(j) ⊲ Invariant: Y = X ∪ {j, . . . ,m}
Set bj ← v(Y \ j) − v(Y ) + p(j)
if aj ≥ bj then
Set X ← X ∪ j
else
Set Y ← Y \ j
return X ⊲ or return Y (as X = Y by now)
2. MeetInMiddle(v,p/2,M) is an (12 ,
1
2) approximate demand oracle for prices p/2 (i.e. for any
submodular v we have v(S)− p(S)/2 ≥ 12 maxT {v(T ) − p(T )}).
Example D.1. For any ǫ > 0, let K = 4/ǫ and N = 2+(K − 1)/ǫ and M = {1, 2, ...N}. Consider
the price vector p(1) = K2 +1 and ∀i > 1 : p(i) = 1− ǫ and the bidder valuation function v(S) = K
for any S ∋ 1 and v(S) = 1 + (|S| − 1)ǫ for any S ∋ 1. One can check that the valuation function
is submodular.
MeetInMiddle will remove the first item from X, since v(M − 1) − v(M) + p(1) = K2 + 1 >
K
2 − 1 = v(1)− p(1). Similarly, one can check that the algorithm will then remove all items except
the last item N , which it will keep. Thus the algorithm returns set T = {N}, so v(T )− p(T ) = ǫ.
However, the optimal set is O = {1}. We have ǫ(v(O) − p(O)) = ǫ(2ǫ − 1) = 2 − ǫ. Thus
v(T ) − ǫ(p(T )) < ǫ(v(O) − p(O)), and MeedInMiddle(v,p,M) is not a (ǫ, ǫ) approximate demand
oracle for all constant 1 > ǫ > 0.
Claim D.2. If v is submodular, S =MeetInMiddle(v,p/2,M) is an (12 ,
1
2) approximate demand
oracle for prices p/2 (i.e. v(S)− p(S)/2 ≥ 12 maxT {v(T ) − p(T )}.
Proof. Let T ←MeetInMiddle(v,p/2,M) and O = argmaxS⊆M v(S)− p(S). We use induction on
|M |.
For the base case, let |M | = 1. Observe that a1 = v(1)−p(1)/2 = −b1. Thus, T = ∅ only when
v(1) ≥ p(1)/2, so T is exactly argmaxS v(S)− p(S)/2 ≥ v(O)− p(O).
Now, let |M | > 1, and assume by induction that the claim is true for all m′ < |M |. Consider
the following two cases:
• If 1 6∈ T , then
v(1) − p(1)
2
= a1 < b1 = v(M \ 1)− v(M) + p(1)
2
⇒ p(1) > v(1) + v(M)− v(M \ 1) ≥ v(1). (*)
thus 1 6∈ O. If M ′ =M \1, then T =MeetInMiddle(v,p/2,M ′) and O = argmaxS⊆M ′ v(S)−
p(S). By the inductive hypothesis, v(T )− 12p(T ) ≥ 12(v(O) − p(O)).
• Suppose 1 ∈ T . Let M ′ =M \ 1 and let O2 be the set that maximizes utility on M ′ for v at
prices p (i.e. O2 = argmaxS⊆M ′ v(S) − p(S)). The negation of (∗) plus the submodularity
of v tells us that
p(1) ≤ v(1) + v(M) − v(M \ 1) ≤ v(1) + v(O2 ∪ 1)− v(O2). (†)
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Define a new submodular function v′ on M ′ such that v′(S) = v(S ∪ 1)− v(1) for all S ⊆M ′.
One can check that an item > 1 is added to X in MeetInMiddle(v,p/2,M) if and only if it is
added to X in MeetInMiddle(v′,p/2,M ′). Thus, T \ 1 =MeetInMiddle(v′,p/2,M ′), and the
inductive hypothesis tells us that v′(T \ 1)− 12p(T \ 1) ≥ 12(v′(O′2)− p(O′2)), where O′2 is the
set that maximizes utility on M ′ for v′ on prices p (i.e. O′2 = argmaxS⊆M ′ v
′(S)− p(S)).
We now analyze two subcases:
– If 1 ∈ O, then O = 1 ∪O′2. Thus, applying the inductive hypothesis we know
v(T )− p(T )
2
= v(1) − 1
2
p(1) + (v′(T \ 1)− 1
2
p(T \ 1))
≥ v(1) − 1
2
p(1) +
1
2
(v′(O′2)− p(O′2))
≥ 1
2
(
v(1) + v′(O′2)− p(1) − p(O′2)
)
=
1
2
(v(O) − p(O))).
– If 1 6∈ O, then O = O2. By rearranging (†), we get
p(1) ≤ 2v(1) + v′(O2)− v(O2)
⇒ v(O2)− v′(O2) ≤ 2
(
v(1)− p(1)
2
)
. (§)
Thus
1
2
(v(O)− p(O)) = 1
2
(
v(O2)− p(O2)
)
=
1
2
(
v′(O2)− p(O2) + v(O2)− v′(O2)
)
≤ 1
2
(
v′(O′2)− p(O′2) + v(O2)− v′(O2)
)
≤ v′(T \ 1)− p(T \ 1)
2
+ v(1) − p(1)
2
= v(T )− p(T )
2
.
Where the first inequality follows from the definition of O′2, and the second follows from the
inductive hypothesis combined with (§).
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